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Grand jury proceedings are shrouded in secrecy. No judge presides over them,
no reporter annotates them, and when they have concluded, no juror may speak
about them. While secrecy serves many important functions for the grand jury, its
veil may be lifted under certain circumstances. Grand jury records may be released
if they fall under a disclosure exception laid out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). While some courts limit release to the exceptions laid out in the Rule, others look to an alternative source of authority.
Several courts of appeals have held that district court judges may exercise inherent supervisory power in authorizing the release of grand jury records. Judges
may consider the public interest in disclosure, compare it to the institutional interest
in secrecy, and decide for themselves. Other circuits find no such power.
The circuits have reached an impasse on the text of the Rule alone, with each
side offering compelling but incomplete justifications for their interpretation. This
Comment provides an alternative path forward. By examining the history of the
grand jury and the relationship between the Federal Rules and common law supervisory power, this Comment argues that district court judges lack inherent supervisory power over the grand jury to order disclosure. Courts that follow the exhaustive
position—that Rule 6(e)(3) limits the exceptions when a court may authorize disclosure—better align with the understanding of the grand jury as an independent body.
Conscious of this historical positioning, this Comment returns to both influential
and overlooked Supreme Court precedent and offers a more contextually grounded
interpretation of each. Judges have discretion to act within the bounds of Rule 6(e),
not outside of it.
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INTRODUCTION
Stuart McKeever wants to know what happened in an infamous grand jury room over sixty years ago. A Columbia University professor named Jesús de Galíndez Suárez had disappeared
in 1956.1 Suárez, a sharp critic of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, was presumed to have been kidnapped and murdered by the
Trujillo regime.2 After an FBI agent was suspected in the crime
and questioned before a grand jury, the case went cold.3 McKeever
had been writing about Suárez’s disappearance for forty years,
and he believed that the agent’s sealed grand jury records held
the key to the decades-old mystery.4 All the court had to do was
authorize their release.
But McKeever’s case was felled by a humble procedural rule,
one that the court explained provided an exhaustive list of

1
2
3
4

McKeever v Barr, 920 F3d 842, 843 (DC Cir 2019), cert denied, 140 S Ct 597 (2020).
Id.
See id at 843–44 (noting that the grand jury did not find probable cause to indict).
See id at 843.
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situations in which a judge could authorize disclosure of grand
jury materials. While McKeever acknowledged that disclosure on
the grounds of historical significance fell outside the scope of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) (the “Rule”), he argued that
a district court judge could exercise supervisory power to disclose
grand jury proceedings.5
The DC Circuit held that the district court had no such
power.6 This decision broke with the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits at the time, which had each held that judges have
some inherent power to act outside the Rule’s exceptions.7 I will
refer to that as the “permissive” approach. The DC Circuit remarked that “we simply cannot agree” with the Seventh Circuit’s
position, thereby acknowledging its creation of a circuit split.8 I
will refer to the DC Circuit’s interpretation as the “exhaustive”
approach. McKeever v Barr9 was the first decision to squarely confront the permissive approach and to decidedly reject it.
The circuits have reached an impasse. The recent cases reveal an interpretative divide over whether courts are endowed
with inherent power to act outside of the Federal Rules. The Seventh, Eleventh, and DC Circuits have each chosen to focus on the
language of Rule 6(e) and found answers within the confines of
the text. The Seventh Circuit determined that the Rule is clearly
intended to be permissive, the DC Circuit confidently declared the
opposite, and the Eleventh Circuit recently switched from the permissive to the exhaustive approach.
Beyond differing interpretations of a procedural rule, the
split reveals a division in the understanding of the institutional
relationship between federal courts and the grand jury: To what
extent do judges have judicial authority over grand jury
5

See McKeever, 920 F3d at 845.
Id at 850.
7
After McKeever was handed down in April 2019, the Eleventh Circuit voted to rehear Pitch v United States, 915 F3d 704 (11th Cir 2019) (Pitch I), en banc in June of that
year. Pitch v United States, 925 F3d 1224, 1224–25 (11th Cir 2019). On March 27, 2020,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed its prior panel decision and held that district court judges
do not have inherent power to disclose outside the exceptions in Rule 6(e), overturning its
influential precedent in In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F2d
1261 (11th Cir 1984) (Hastings), and siding with the DC Circuit. Pitch v United States,
953 F3d 1226, 1241 (11th Cir 2020) (en banc) (Pitch II).
8
McKeever, 920 F3d at 850. Whether the DC Circuit created a new split or shed
light on an existing one is addressed in Part II.E.1. Because the latest decisions under the
permissive approach viewed their position to be unanimous, it seems appropriate to refer
to McKeever as creating a new split.
9
920 F3d 842, 843 (DC Cir 2019).
6
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proceedings? I aim to resolve the circuit split by first understanding the relationship of the grand jury to the judiciary. Once established, I determine whether supervisory power survived the codification of the Federal Rules. Finally, I reexamine Supreme Court
precedent to question the view that supervisory power extends
over the grand jury.
I argue that district court judges lack inherent supervisory
power to order disclosure of grand jury materials. The exhaustive
position—that Rule 6(e)(3) is exhaustive in its exceptions as to
when a court may authorize disclosure—has a solid basis in the
original understanding of the grand jury as an independent body.
Further, Congress abrogated any supervisory power over the
grand jury that existed at common law by codifying Rule 6(e).
This interpretation aligns with a contextualized reading of the
oft-cited Supreme Court decisions on this matter.
The Supreme Court denied McKeever’s petition for writ of
certiorari on January 21, 2020.10 In denying review, the Court has
left the issue to percolate among the circuits. Justice Stephen
Breyer, in a statement respecting the denial of certiorari, issued
a call to action: “Whether district courts retain authority to release grand jury material outside those situations specifically
enumerated in the Rules, or in situations like this, is an important question. It is one I think the [Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules (Rules Committee)] both can and should revisit.”11
Settling this question will provide clarity to four key stakeholders: the remaining circuits, the Rules Committee, the government, and members of the public seeking these records. The majority of circuits, yet to weigh in on the issue, must look beyond
the opposing textual analyses of the circuit split. This Comment
provides a novel solution to these stakeholders. By accepting the
textual ambiguity that courts thus far have refused to
acknowledge, this Comment looks instead for clues in the history
of the grand jury and overlooked Court precedent.
This Comment is composed of three parts. Part I provides a
background on the grand jury, Rule 6(e), and supervisory power.
Part II describes the circuit split, tracing the expansion of the
judge-made supervisory-power exception and culminating in the
current divide between the Second and Seventh Circuits on one
side and the Eleventh and DC Circuits on the other. Part III
10
11

McKeever v Barr, 140 S Ct 597 (2020).
Id at 598 (Breyer respecting denial of certiorari).
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argues that Rule 6(e) should be read exhaustively, as any supervisory power that courts may have had over the grand jury was
accounted for in the exceptions provided within the Rule. Recent
decisions justify departure from the Rule by explaining that access to these documents serves the press and the public. If disclosures outside the current exceptions promote the public interest,
the courts and the public should push Congress to amend the
Rule.
I. BACKGROUND
Background on the grand jury and the possible sources of authority over it will help clarify whether Rule 6(e)’s exceptions are
exhaustive or permissive. I first describe the role of the grand jury
and how the grand jury differs from the trial jury. I then introduce
Rule 6(e), the statutory authority for when grand jury proceedings may be disclosed. Finally, I explain the idea of supervisory
power and its relationship to the Federal Rules.
A. The Grand Jury
A grand jury must determine whether to initiate judicial proceedings before any serious federal crime is brought to trial.12
From an initial pool of randomly selected citizens, twenty-three
are selected to serve on the jury for a period not to exceed eighteen
months.13 A district court judge administers an oath, under which
jurors swear that they will perform their investigations diligently, they will indict truthfully, and they will not disclose anything they learn.14 After administering the oath, the judge retires,
her formal involvement with the process complete.15 Then, the
prosecutor takes over.16
Once proceedings have begun, the grand jury reviews the
case and weighs the evidence that the prosecutor presents.17

12 See US Const Amend V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”).
13 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused,
80 Cornell L Rev 260, 265 (1995).
14 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Handbook for Federal
Grand Jurors *3–6, archived at https://perma.cc/YS32-S5WM.
15 Leipold, 80 Cornell L Rev at 265 (cited in note 13).
16 See id at 266. See also United States v Williams, 504 US 36, 47 (1992) (“Judges’
direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to . . .
calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office.”).
17 See Leipold, 80 Cornell L Rev at 266 (cited in note 13).
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When a federal prosecutor presents a case before the grand jury,
she is both the jury’s legal advisor and the party seeking an indictment.18 The prosecutor informs the jurors of the charges, decides what evidence to present, and answers juror questions on
the law.19 By representing the federal government, the prosecutor
has an obligation “to execute the laws in an impartial and just
manner.”20 She ought to advise the grand jury of the evidence
without directing the jurors to indict.21
Throughout the course of the proceedings, grand jurors may
ask questions of the witnesses and the prosecutor.22 Rather than
evaluating guilt or innocence, the grand jurors must determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has
committed a crime.23 If at least twelve jurors agree that there is
probable cause, they will return a “true bill.”24 A true bill constitutes the basis of an indictment, sparking a criminal case and
framing the charges that will be brought against the defendant.25
If the grand jury is not convinced of probable cause, the case cannot move forward.26
Endowed with significant investigative powers, grand jurors
must decide what comes next for the accused. Jurors are allowed
to consider, for example, evidence that was obtained illegally,
hearsay, and their preexisting knowledge of the crime.27 Prosecutors are not required to present the evidence in a neutral manner,
meaning that exculpatory evidence does not need to be disclosed.28
The grand jury is thus distinct from the trial jury in several
important respects. While the trial jury clearly falls under the judicial branch, the grand jury is better understood as a “quasi-political

18 See Susan M. Schiappa, Preserving the Autonomy and Function of the Grand Jury:
United States v. Williams, 43 Cath U L Rev 311, 332–33 (1993).
19 See id.
20 Id at 332, citing Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation [is] to govern impartially.”).
21 Schiappa, 43 Cath U L Rev at 332 (cited in note 18).
22 See Leipold, 80 Cornell L Rev at 266 (cited in note 13).
23 See id.
24 Id.
25 See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 Georgetown L J 1265, 1276, 1280 (2006).
26 See Leipold, 80 Cornell L Rev at 266 (cited in note 13).
27 Id at 267.
28 Id. See also McKethan v United States, 439 US 936, 938 (1978) (Stewart dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (“In grand jury proceedings, the ordinary rules of evidence do not
apply. Leading questions and multiple hearsay are permitted and common.”).
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institution.”29 Trial juries are seen as “officers of the court[ ]” who
follow the instructions of the presiding judge and aim to reach an
outcome consistent with the law.30 It is the job of the judiciary, the
trial jury included, to interpret and apply the law as written.31 In
contrast, grand jurors have “independent authority” to reject
given applications of the law and to indict without a judge presiding over them.32 The grand jury is understood “as an institution
that is neither strictly prosecutorial, nor strictly judicial, but
sometimes exercises political or quasi-legislative powers.”33 With
full control over whether to indict, grand juries have a veto-like
power to push back on unpopular laws.34 This positioning dates
back to their inclusion in the Bill of Rights rather than the Constitution or the First Judiciary Act.35 This institutional distance
is important, as it suggests that grand juries exist as a check on
the government, including the judiciary, by the people.
B. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)
Today, the structure and requirements of grand jury proceedings are dictated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6. The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, codified in 1946, aim “to
provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding,
to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration,
and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.”36 Congress
passed legislation in 194037 that authorized the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for criminal procedure, striving to balance the
needs of law enforcement and the accused.38 The Court created a
single set of rules of criminal procedure, which were sent to

29

Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 Fordham L Rev 2333, 2367 (2008).
Id.
31 See id.
32 Id.
33 Washburn, 76 Fordham L Rev at 2367 (cited in note 29).
34 See id at 2366 (“Blocking a law is not necessarily a prosecutorial function nor an
adjudicative function, but a political and somewhat legislative one.”).
35 See id (arguing that the grand jury “was enshrined in the Bill of Rights for its
ability to undermine unpopular laws or to block their application in the local community”).
36 FRCrP 2.
37 See Sumners Courts Act, Pub L No 76-675, 54 Stat 688 (1940), codified as
amended at 28 USC §§ 2071–72.
38 Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its
Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 Fla St U L Rev 1, 23 n 155 (1996).
30
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Congress and approved.39 The adoption of Rule 6 incorporated the
common law understanding of the grand jury into statutory law.40
The default understanding of secrecy for the protection of the accused remained intact through subsections (d) and (e).41 Only the
attorney for the government, the witness, the jurors, and a court
reporter may be present during the proceedings.42 When it is time
to vote, the grand jurors shall be left alone.43 But the Rule also
recognizes the practical challenges for law enforcement that total
secrecy creates. The Rule allows, for example, a government attorney to share grand jury information with another federal
grand jury.44 This ensures that conflicting accounts from witnesses or accused parties do not escape scrutiny across juries.
Rule 6 details the procedural framework for how federal
grand juries operate.45 Subsections (a)–(d) provide procedural instructions for how to convene. These subsections explain how to
summon a jury, how to object to a juror, how to appoint a foreperson, and who may be present during the proceedings. Rule 6(e)
outlines the requirements for disclosure or recording of the grand
jury proceedings.46 Rule 6(e)(1) informs the parties that all proceedings are to be recorded, and any records are to be retained by
the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered by the
court.47
The subsections at issue in the circuit split are (e)(2)
and (e)(3)—entitled “Secrecy” and “Exceptions,” respectively.
Most of the debate is focused on Rule 6(e)(3)(E).
The secrecy subsection is designed to inform the parties of
who must remain silent and who may later speak about the proceedings. Rule 6(e)(2)(B) states that “[u]nless these rules provide
otherwise, the following persons must not disclose a matter

39 See id. See also Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum L
Rev 1433, 1440 (1984).
40 See Kadish, 24 Fla St U L Rev at 24 (cited in note 38).
41 See id.
42 FRCrP 6(d)(1).
43 FRCrP 6(d)(2). If any juror requires assistance for a hearing or speech impairment,
the Rule also allows for an interpreter to be present to aid that juror. FRCrP 6(d)(2).
44 FRCrP 6(e)(3)(C).
45 Alex Thrasher, Judicial Construction of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)—
Historical Evolution and Circuit Interpretation Regarding Disclosure of Grand Jury Proceedings to Third Parties, 48 Cumb L Rev 587, 590 (2018).
46 See FRCrP 6(e).
47 FRCrP 6(e)(1).
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occurring before the grand jury,”48 and then lists all the parties
present in the proceedings listed in subsection (d), with the exception of witnesses. Witnesses may speak freely as to what they
were asked and what they revealed. Jurors may not.
The exceptions subsection provides the list of situations in
which the previous requirement of secrecy may not apply. Subsections (e)(3)(A)–(D) detail exceptions to the nondisclosure obligation for government prosecutors.49
Subsection (e)(3)(E) is the most relevant exception for the
purposes of the split and this Comment because it lays out the
instances in which the court may authorize disclosure.50 The first
of the five options allows a court to disclose grand jury matter that
is “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.”51
This is the only listed exception under which the court may authorize disclosure without previously receiving a request from another party. The next listed exception allows a judge to disclose
grand jury matter at the request of a defendant on the grounds
that the material may reveal an indictment to be in error.52 The
last three exceptions are each at the request of the government to
show violations of the law.53

48
49
50

FRCrP 6(e)(2)(B).
See FRCrP 6(e)(3)(A)–(D).
Rule 6(e)(3)(E) states:

The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a manner, and subject to any
other conditions that it directs—of a grand-jury matter. See FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E):
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand
jury;
(iii) at the request of the government, when sought by a foreign court or
prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation;
(iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation of State, Indian tribal, or foreign criminal law, as long as
the disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-subdivision, Indian tribal, or
foreign government official for the purpose of enforcing that law; or
(v) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose
a violation of military criminal law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate military official for the
purpose of enforcing that law.
51
52
53

FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(ii).
FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(iii)–(v).
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C. Supervisory Power
Supervisory power is considered to fall within the judicial
power conferred by Article III.54 The term “supervisory power” refers to a court’s inherent authority to govern its own proceedings.55 In Bank of Nova Scotia v United States,56 the Supreme
Court explained that “[i]n the exercise of its supervisory authority, a federal court may, within limits, formulate procedural rules
not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.”57 A
court may invoke this power when necessary to protect judicial
integrity.58 The Supreme Court has noted that this power is justified by the judge’s need to ensure the fairness of proceedings and
rebuke misconduct of the parties.59
The Court first addressed the concept of supervisory power in
1943 in McNabb v United States.60 In McNabb, federal officers interrogated several suspects accused of murder before arraigning
them.61 Over the course of the interrogation, the suspects made
several admissions and produced evidence that the government
wished to use at trial.62 The officers had purposely delayed bringing the suspects before a presiding judge until they admitted to
the crime, and the Court questioned whether their interrogation
tactics exceeded the scope of permissible conduct.63 Regarding the
admission of their statements into evidence at trial, the Court
held that “a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of
justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence secured under the circumstances revealed
here.”64 The exclusion of the evidence was necessary to avoid making the courts “accomplices in wilful disobedience of the law.”65
The Court reached this determination by relying on its “supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts.”66 The principles for refusing to admit evidence
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

See Beale, 84 Colum L Rev at 1464 (cited in note 39).
Schiappa, 43 Cath U L Rev at 335 (cited in note 18).
487 US 250 (1988).
Id at 254 (quotation marks omitted).
See Beale, 84 Colum L Rev at 1464 (cited in note 39).
See Schiappa, 43 Cath U L Rev at 336 (cited in note 18).
318 US 332 (1943).
Id at 334–38.
Id.
See id at 338–39.
McNabb, 318 US at 347.
Id at 345.
Id at 341.
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are not limited to those laid out in the Constitution, the Court
argued, but are supplemented by “rules of evidence” that “this
Court has, from the very beginning of its history, formulated.”67
The Court explained that federal courts have a duty to ensure the
administration of justice and that this responsibility includes
“maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.”68
The Court later clarified in Carlisle v United States69 that procedural rules established by the Constitution or Congress abrogate the scope of a federal court’s authority to create its own procedural rules. Federal courts “may, within limits, formulate
procedural rules,” but “[w]hatever the scope of this inherent
power, [ ] it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”70 Courts may not disregard federal rules, constitutional
provisions, or existing statutes in exercising those powers.71 When
one of those sources of authority exists and applies to the issue at
hand, the judge should follow the guidance of that authority.72 A
judge may exercise supervisory power over trial proceedings only
when there is no applicable controlling guidance.73
***
There are two possible sources of authority over the federal
grand jury. This Part has described the differences between the
federal grand jury and the federal trial jury, showing that the two
entities have distinct roles and responsibilities. While a trial jury
is an extension of the judge in seeking to determine what the law
says, the grand jury has independent authority to indict or not
indict without the supervision of a presiding judge. Grand jurors
are still instructed and guided by a prosecutor, both subject to
clear protocols laid out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.
The question then is whether the Federal Rules are the sole
source of authority over the grand jury, or, as with the trial jury,

67

Id.
McNabb, 318 US at 340.
69 517 US 416 (1996).
70 Id at 426 (quotation marks omitted). See also Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 US at 254
(“[I]t is well established that even a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power is
invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.”) (quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
71 See Carlisle, 517 US at 426.
72 See id.
73 See id.
68
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a district court judge can exercise supervisory power over it. This
question has produced conflicting answers among the circuits, as
the courts grapple with whether there is a singular source of authority or that codified authority allows room for discretionary
power. The following Part describes the slow, steady acceptance
of supervisory power by some in following the permissive approach, and the total rejection of it by others.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The DC Circuit created a circuit split last year over the correct interpretation of Rule 6(e). The Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits had each previously found that disclosures outside
of the listed exceptions in Rule 6(e) could be justified by a district
court judge’s use of the supervisory power. In contrast, the DC
Circuit held that Rule 6(e) provides an exhaustive list of exceptions to the default of secrecy in grand jury proceedings. The DC
Circuit found support for its decision from the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits, though closer examination of their holdings reveals that
these opinions are less supportive than the DC Circuit assumed.
With the Eleventh Circuit’s recent reversal, the exhaustive approach gained critical on-point support.
This Part proceeds in five sections. Part II.A examines the
introduction of supervisory power in grand jury cases by the Second Circuit. Part II.B describes the Eleventh Circuit’s embrace of
supervisory power for cases “closely analogous”74 to the listed exceptions within the Rule. Part II.C details the beginning of the
“historical significance” exception. In creating this exception, the
Second Circuit expanded on its earlier precedent to show that records related to events of public interest could qualify as extraordinary circumstances. The first three sections show that the supervisory-power exception has evolved from a one-off allowance
that all parties agreed was warranted to a broader, more contested authorization when the judge finds the aim socially
worthwhile.
The final two sections describe the current divide over the use
of supervisory power to disclose grand jury records deemed historically significant. While the Eleventh Circuit plays a role in the
current split, the Seventh and DC Circuits provide the clearest

74 In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F2d 1261, 1268 (11th
Cir 1984) (Hastings).
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contrast in views. Despite their contrast in conclusions, both circuits believe the answer clearly lies in a close examination of the
Rule.
A. The Second Circuit’s Initial Departure from Rule 6(e)
In In re Biaggi,75 the Second Circuit first addressed the possibility that disclosure could be permitted outside the Rule. The
case before the court was unique because both the witness and
the prosecutor endorsed disclosure.76 The witness, thenCongressman Mario Biaggi, was running for mayor of New York
City.77 Biaggi had previously testified before a grand jury, and a
New York Times report claimed that a reliable source had revealed that Biaggi refused to answer questions related to his finances during those proceedings.78 Wanting to counter the report,
Biaggi sought release of his grand jury testimony.79 Likewise, the
US attorney agreed to move for disclosure of Biaggi’s testimony
so long as the records removed the portions that related to other
named witnesses.80
Chief Judge Henry Friendly began by acknowledging that
this case fell outside the scope of the disclosure exceptions listed
in the Rule.81 The court struggled, however, to find an argument
for secrecy when the witness himself sought disclosure to clear
his name.82 Rather, if secrecy “was designed for the protection of
the witnesses who appear, Mr. Biaggi waved this protection by
seeking complete disclosure in the form of a motion requesting
disclosure of his own testimony.”83 Furthermore, “[i]nsofar as the
rule exists for the benefit of the Government, the United States
Attorney [ ] waived it in the clearest terms.”84 The Second Circuit

75

478 F2d 489 (2d Cir 1973).
Id at 491.
77 Id at 490.
78 Id.
79 Biaggi, 478 F2d at 490–91.
80 Id at 491.
81 Id at 492.
82 See id at 493. But see United States v Johnson, 319 US 503, 513 (1943) (emphasizing that grand jury secrecy is “as important for the protection of the innocent as for the
pursuit of the guilty”). Biaggi, of course, could have repeated his testimony without a court
order, but he needed a court order to obtain the record of his testimony. See note 18.
83 Biaggi, 478 F2d at 493 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
84 Id.
76
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decided that Biaggi and the government could waive their secrecy
protection, and the court authorized disclosure.85
The dissent recognized the stakes of this decision: “[W]ithout
the support of any authority in the statute or the case law, [the
majority] created another exception, applicable to the situation
where a witness waives the secrecy requirement by seeking release of the grand jury minutes.”86 This decision, according to
Judge Paul R. Hays, went beyond the scope of the Rule and its
list of exceptions.87 In a supplemental opinion following the public
release of Biaggi’s testimony, Chief Judge Friendly responded to
the sharp dissent and cabined the court’s decision to its unique
facts.88 Chief Judge Friendly emphasized that “[o]ur decision
should therefore not be taken as demanding, or even authorizing,
public disclosure. . . . [Disclosure] rests on the exercise of a sound
discretion under the special circumstances of this case.”89 Unsatisfied, Judge Hays replied: “The law forbids the publication of
these Grand Jury minutes. In my opinion the rules of law are a
more reliable guide to the administration of justice than the personal views of judges as to what ‘the public interest’ may require.”90
B. Supervisory Power over “Closely Analogous” Cases from the
Eleventh Circuit
In In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials91
(Hastings), the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Biaggi to hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it exercised supervisory power over a situation
similar to an authorized exception.92 The case concerned the
grand jury proceedings of then-Judge Alcee Hastings who was under investigation for a bribery charge and was later indicted and
acquitted.93 A special committee of judges sought to determine
whether Judge Hastings should stay on the bench, and the committee requested access to the jury records to assess his conduct.94
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88
89
90
91
92
93
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Id.
Id at 494 (Hays dissenting).
Biaggi, 478 F2d at 493–94 (Hays dissenting).
See id at 494 (supplemental opinion).
Id.
Id (Hays dissenting).
735 F2d 1261 (11th Cir 1984).
See id at 1268.
Id at 1263.
Id at 1263–64.
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He opposed, arguing that disclosure of the records was not permitted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).95 The district court allowed the disclosure, but in seeking to “minimize the
breach of secrecy,” the court required that the records only be
available for ninety days, stored in the office of the US attorney,
and visible to the five members of the judicial committee investigating Judge Hastings.96
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the committee’s
work is “at least closely analogous” to a judicial proceeding, an
exception to secrecy allowed under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i).97 “The procedures . . . may not be a ‘judicial proceeding’ in the strict sense
. . . but they are very similar,”98 and therefore disclosure was appropriate.99 The court added that the limited scope of the disclosure and the importance of the mission of investigating possible
corruption in the judiciary merited the use of supervisory
power.100
The Hastings court cited to Biaggi for the notion that common
law principles still applied,101 and to an earlier Supreme Court
decision to advance its idea that “the [R]ule is not the true source
of the district court’s power.”102 The court relied on the following
language in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co v United States103 to justify
its conclusion that the district court had inherent power: “[T]he
federal trial courts as well as the Courts of Appeals have been
nearly unanimous in regarding disclosure as committed to the
discretion of the trial judge. Our cases announce the same principle, and Rule 6(e) is but declaratory of it.”104 The Hastings court
explained that this language showed that courts have inherent
supervisory power beyond the language of the Rule to decide
whether to order disclosure.105 Several more circuits would go on
95

Hastings, 735 F2d at 1264.
Id at 1265.
97 Id at 1268.
98 Id.
99 Hastings, 735 F2d at 1268. But see Pitch v United States, 953 F3d 1226, 1242 (11th
Cir 2020) (en banc) (Pitch II) (Pryor concurring) (supporting the outcome but not the reasoning of its precedent, as “the ‘judicial proceeding’ exception, [Rule] 6(e)(3)(E)(i), plainly
permitted the limited disclosure of the grand jury records to the Investigating Committee
of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit in Hastings”).
100 Hastings, 735 F2d at 1268.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 360 US 395 (1959).
104 Id at 399.
105 See Hastings, 735 F2d at 1268.
96
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to rely on Hastings and its interpretation of Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co to justify discretionary power decisions. As I show, this
reliance proved problematic.
C. Adopting “Special Circumstances” for Historically
Significant Cases
Twenty-five years after deciding Biaggi, the Second Circuit
was asked to expand the exception again. To address future cases,
the court created a multifactor test to determine whether disclosure outside of the Rule was justified, and this test and its reasoning have become the standard for other courts.106 In re Petition
of Craig107 concerned a doctoral student’s request for a seventynine-page grand jury transcript.108 Bruce Craig was writing his
dissertation on Harry Dexter White, a former government official
who had been accused of being a communist spy.109 White appeared before a grand jury in 1948 to answer questions pertaining
to the allegation before passing away several months later.110
Craig argued that he had reviewed all publicly available evidence
on White but needed access to the grand jury transcript to complete his dissertation.111 Craig asked the court to rely on its supervisory power to order disclosure because the information was historically important and release served the public interest.112
After emphasizing the important protections that secrecy enables, the court quoted the same language as Hastings from Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.113 Like the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, cited
approvingly by the Second Circuit, the court used this language
to determine that courts have discretion outside the Rule.114 The
Craig court supplemented this understanding by drawing upon
the “special circumstances” language of its own precedent in

106 See, for example, Carlson v United States, 837 F3d 753, 766 (7th Cir 2016); Pitch
v United States, 915 F3d 704, 710–11 (11th Cir 2019) (Pitch I).
107 131 F3d 99 (2d Cir 1997).
108 Id at 100–01.
109 Id at 101.
110 Id.
111 Craig, 131 F3d at 101.
112 Id.
113 Id at 102, quoting Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 360 US at 399 (“[T]he federal trial
courts as well as the Courts of Appeals have been nearly unanimous in regarding disclosure as committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Our cases announce the same principle, and Rule 6(e) is but declaratory of it.”).
114 Craig, 131 F3d at 102.
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Biaggi as evidence that its analysis did not need to be confined to
the Rule.115
Drawing on Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, Biaggi, and Hastings,
the court put forward a set of nonexhaustive factors for courts to
consider when dealing with “highly discretionary and fact-sensitive
‘special circumstances’” cases, effectively weighing the continued
need for secrecy against the public interest in learning about the
case.116 One such factor advises courts to consider why the disclosure is being sought but does not clarify which justifications are
worthy. The last factor on the list ponders whether secrecy is still
needed in that particular case. These factors and others leave a
fair amount of room for judicial weighing and discretion. It is not
clear what a judge should consider to determine if secrecy is still
needed in a particular case. Furthermore, even if a witness or the
accused no longer requires secrecy, does release of any formerly
secret case erode the expectation of secrecy in future proceedings?
D. The Current Permissive Approach
The previous three sections show the course that the
supervisory-power exception has taken to reach the current
permissive view. The Second Circuit opened up the possibility of
disclosures outside the Rule when it allowed a subject of the
grand jury investigation access to his own records to clear his
name.117 The Eleventh Circuit then determined that the kind of
extraordinary circumstance found in the Second Circuit’s case
could also merit disclosure in situations closely analogous to the
exceptions within the Rule.118 Finally, the Second Circuit created

115

Id.
See id at 106. The Second Circuit identified nine factors for district courts to consider. Id:
116

(i) the identity of the party seeking disclosure; (ii) whether the defendant to the
grand jury proceeding or the government opposes the disclosure; (iii) why disclosure is being sought in the particular case; (iv) what specific information is being
sought for disclosure; (v) how long ago the grand jury proceedings took place;
(vi) the current status of the principals of the grand jury proceedings and that of
their families; (vii) the extent to which the desired material—either permissibly
or impermissibly—has been previously made public; (viii) whether witnesses to
the grand jury proceedings who might be affected by disclosure are still alive;
and (ix) the additional need for maintaining secrecy in the particular case in
question.
117
118

See Part II.A.
See Part II.B.
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a balancing test, weighing the public interest in the material
against the continued need for secrecy.119
There are two main takeaways from the prior three sections.
First, the supervisory-power exception has grown in scope, meaning that judges will face the question whether they are authorized
to exercise supervisory power more often. Second, the courts up
to this point had been in agreement, each finding that there are
instances in which disclosure outside of the text of Rule 6 is allowed. This unanimity is important to remember in evaluating
the current divide. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits seemed to
have taken as given that disclosure was allowed, until a recent
reversal by the Eleventh Circuit. The DC Circuit now has the support of a sister circuit in pushing back, just as confident in its own
view as its sister circuits are in the opposite conclusion. The Seventh Circuit still finds room for supervisory power in the Rule’s
permissive language.
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Carlson v United States120 is
the primary example of supervisory power justifying disclosure of
historically significant grand jury materials.121 Chief Judge Diane
Wood wrote that the answer was clear: supervisory power over
grand jury disclosure clearly exists and works alongside the permissive disclosure exceptions within the Rule.122
The Seventh Circuit offered a thorough review of Supreme
Court precedent to argue for the existence of supervisory power.
The court began by citing to United States v Williams,123 the most
recent applicable Supreme Court precedent, to note that the
grand jury works “in the courthouse and under judicial auspices.”124 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion quickly moves on from Williams, as most of that opinion focuses on why the grand jury is
separate from the judiciary. Citing to Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co
and United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co,125 the court explained
119

See Part II.C.
837 F3d 753 (7th Cir 2016).
121 For a case using the idea of inherent power to bolster the secrecy requirement, see
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F3d 18, 26 (1st Cir 2005) (holding that the court had
“inherent judicial power” to increase the category of people bound to secrecy). See also In
re Special Grand Jury 89–2, 450 F3d 1159, 1178 (10th Cir 2006) (noting that “some relief
may be proper under the court’s inherent authority” but sending the case back to the district court without deciding the issue).
122 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 755–56.
123 504 US 36 (1992).
124 Carlson, 837 F3d at 761 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Williams, 504 US at 47.
125 310 US 150 (1940).
120
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that disclosure was “committed to the discretion of the trial
judge.”126 Satisfied that supervisory power existed, the Seventh
Circuit cautioned that Court precedent showed that “supervisory
power is ‘a very limited one’” that “may be used only to ‘preserve
or enhance the traditional functioning’ of the grand jury.”127
Even with this limitation, the court explained that the ability
to disclose at the judge’s discretion existed at common law and
continues to exist today.128 The court repeated the language from
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co—a case decided before the creation of the
Rules—that release of materials “‘rests in the sound discretion of
the [trial] court’ and ‘disclosure is wholly proper where the ends
of justice require it.’”129 The Rules did not eliminate this discretion
because “permissive rules do not ‘abrogate the power of the courts’
to exercise their historical ‘inherent power’ when doing so does
not contradict a rule.”130 Rules are permissive, the court continued, when the text permits a court to pursue some action without
limiting language.131 The use of “may” in Rule 6(e)(3)(E), the court
emphasized, shows the Rule to be permissive.132
The Seventh Circuit held that the list of exceptions in
Rule 6(e)(3)(E) is not intended to be exhaustive, meaning the district court may act on its inherent authority without contravening
the Rule.133 Subsection (e)(3)(E) lists five specific exceptions for
when a court may authorize disclosure of grand jury proceedings.
The dissent argued that subsection (e)(2)—entitled “Secrecy”—
imposes a “broad secrecy norm . . . unless [the Rules] provide otherwise.”134 The Seventh Circuit explained that the key issue was
whether subsection (e)(2)’s limiting language of “unless these
rules provide otherwise” carries over to subsection (e)(3)(E).135
Chief Judge Wood wrote that the use of explicit limiting language
elsewhere in the Rule suggests that the lack of similar language
126 Carlson, 837 F3d at 761, citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 360 US at 399 (applying
the disclosure principle after the codification of the Federal Rules), and Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co, 310 US at 234 (doing the same before the Federal Rules).
127 Carlson, 837 F3d at 762, quoting Williams, 504 US at 50.
128 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 762.
129 Id, quoting Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US at 233–34.
130 Carlson, 837 F3d at 763, quoting Link v Wabash Railroad Co, 370 US 626 (1962)
(holding that the language of FRCrP 41(b) allowing a defendant to dismiss a case for lack
of prosecution does not abrogate a court’s inherent power to dismiss sua sponte).
131 Carlson, 837 F3d at 763.
132 Id at 764.
133 Id.
134 Id at 768 (Sykes dissenting) (emphasis omitted), citing FRCrP 6(e)(2)(B).
135 Carlson, 837 F3d at 764.
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in subsection (e)(3)(E) is dispositive of permissive intent.136 If the
Rule’s drafters intended the court’s authority to be limited to the
Rule’s exceptions, they would have explicitly said so.137 The
phrase “[t]he court may authorize disclosure” does not include
limiting language such as “only” or “unless listed below.”138 Therefore, the list should be interpreted to be permissive, and judges
may act on their discretion in cases that fall outside of one of the
five categories.139 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Second,
Eleventh, and DC Circuits shared this view.140 Summarizing its
opinion, the court remarked that there was not a single court that
had accepted the government’s interpretation of the Rule as exhaustive, seemingly establishing the Carlson majority’s view of
the issue as settled among the courts of appeals.141
Judge Diane Sykes wrote an equally confident dissent, casting doubt on the majority’s assertion that no federal court had
sided with the government’s position and downplaying the support of a sister circuit. The majority had listed the DC Circuit’s
opinion Haldeman v Sirica142 as additional support for the permissive position because the court in that case affirmed the disclosure by a district court that was not clearly within the exceptions to the Rule.143 Judge Sykes noted that the Haldeman court
did not reason through the use of supervisory power. Rather, the
DC Circuit simply affirmed en banc the decision of the district
court.144 Judge Sykes seemed to suggest that the court never
reached the issue.
Stronger support, Judge Sykes continued, came from the
Eighth Circuit. While the relevance of Haldeman was a question

136

Id.
See id.
138 Id.
139 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 764–65 (“A rule of nonexclusivity does not mean that
Rule 6(e)(3)(E) is pointless: it would be entirely reasonable for the rulemakers to furnish
a list that contains frequently invoked reasons to disclose grand-jury materials, so that
the court knows that no special hesitation is necessary in those circumstances.”).
140 Id at 765–66. But see McKeever, 920 F3d at 847 n 3 (interpreting its own precedent
differently).
141 Carlson, 837 F3d at 755–56, 765 (“[E]very federal court to consider the issue has
adopted Carlson’s view that a district court’s limited inherent power to supervise a grand
jury includes the power to unseal grand-jury materials when appropriate.”).
142 501 F2d 714 (DC Cir 1974).
143 Carlson, 837 F3d at 766. See also Haldeman, 501 F2d at 715 (holding that Rule 6
did not bar a district judge from disclosing grand jury proceedings to the House Judiciary
Committee in the context of impeachment).
144 Carlson, 837 F3d at 770 (Sykes dissenting).
137
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of interpretation, Judge Sykes explained that the Eighth Circuit
precedent supported her interpretation of the Rule.145 In a prior
decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the exceptions to
Rule 6(e)(3)(E) were exhaustive.146 Notwithstanding the majority’s statements to the contrary, Judge Sykes believed that there
was at least one sister circuit on her side.
Moving to the substance of the issue, Judge Sykes explained
that the majority’s reading of the Rule would make the list of exceptions nonsensical.147 By limiting the language of the previous
subsection—“unless these rules provide otherwise”—to that section alone, the exceptions become nonexclusive.148 This reading
turned a list of five detailed exceptions into mere examples of
what a court could do, leaving a court free to disclose grand jury
testimony “to persons and for purposes not identified in the
rule.”149 Rebuking the majority’s argument that the inherent authority of courts is “very limited,” Judge Sykes instead criticized
the decision as a step too far.150 Though the majority suggested
that it recognized and relied upon a limited power, Judge Sykes
found the decision to be an expansive policy judgment: “It’s hard
to see how this ‘very limited’ authority includes the sweeping
power to release grand-jury records to the general public for reasons that strike the judge as socially desirable—here, historical
significance.”151 The DC Circuit would go on to explicitly reject
this type of exception.
E. The Current Exhaustive Approach
The DC Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit offer the two most
recent appellate decisions on this matter, and they are now the
two clearest examples of the exhaustive approach. The DC Circuit
broke from the other courts while the Eleventh Circuit was still
in the permissive camp. After reviewing its recent decision en
banc, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and overturned its decades-

145

See id.
See United States v McDougal, 559 F3d 837, 840 (8th Cir 2009) (“[C]ourts will not
order disclosure absent a recognized exception to Rule 6(e) or a valid challenge to the original sealing order or its implementation.”). McDougal is discussed in detail in Part II.E.
147 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 769 (Sykes dissenting).
148 See id.
149 Id.
150 Id at 771.
151 Carlson, 837 F3d at 771 (Sykes dissenting).
146
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old precedent, joining the DC Circuit in holding that there is no
inherent power outside of the Rule.
1. The DC Circuit’s confident rejection.
The most recent and thorough argument for limiting disclosure exceptions to the confines of the Rule comes from McKeever,
a case in which an academic sought grand jury records related to
the disappearance of a professor and a suspected cover-up.152
McKeever made three arguments for disclosure, none of which
persuaded the court. First, McKeever argued that courts are not
bound to secrecy because they are absent from the list of “persons”
bound by Rule 6(e)(2).153 Second, he asserted that Rule 6 did not
eliminate the preexisting authority of the trial court at common
law, leaving the exceptions laid out in Rule 6(e)(3) as nonexhaustive.154 Third, McKeever urged that the public benefit of disclosure
was greater than the interest in secrecy.155
The court dismissed the first argument that Rule 6(e)(2) does
not apply to courts because “Rule 6 assumes the records are in the
custody of the Government, not that of the court.”156 Attorneys for
the government are included on the list of persons barred from
disclosure; if a court ordered disclosure, it would do so by “ordering ‘an attorney for the government’ who holds the records to disclose the materials.”157
The DC Circuit rejected the argument that district courts
have preexisting authority outside the bounds of the Rule while
acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit had recently come out
the other way.158 While the Seventh Circuit argued that there was
no statutory language that required curtailing the Rule to the exceptions of Rule 6(e)(3), the DC Circuit replied that “[t]he limiting
language the Seventh Circuit sought is plain: Rule 6(e)(2) prohibits disclosure of a grand jury matter unless these rules provide
otherwise.”159 The court argued that subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3)
must be read together.160 Allowing a district court to go beyond
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

See McKeever, 920 F3d at 843.
Id at 847. See also FRCrP 6(e)(2).
McKeever, 920 F3d at 848. See also FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E).
McKeever, 920 F3d at 849.
Id at 848.
Id.
See id at 848–49.
McKeever, 920 F3d at 848 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id at 845.
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those explicit exceptions would “render the detailed list of exceptions merely precatory and impermissibly enable the court to ‘circumvent’ or ‘disregard’ a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.”161
Though the DC Circuit’s decision marked the clearest break from
the other circuits, the majority relied on support from two sister
courts, the Sixth and the Eighth Circuits.
The Sixth Circuit emphasized in In re Grand Jury 89-4-72162
that “Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) is not a rule of convenience.”163 Grand jury
secrecy is not something to be taken lightly, and courts should
exercise caution before considering disclosure: “[W]ithout an unambiguous statement to the contrary from Congress, we cannot,
and must not, breach grand jury secrecy for any purpose other
than those embodied by the Rule.”164 Both the DC Circuit and
Sixth Circuit cited the Supreme Court statement that “[i]n the
absence of a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we must always
be reluctant to conclude that a breach of this secrecy has been
authorized.”165 The Sixth Circuit held that an investigation into a
state judge did not fall within the bounds of being “preliminarily
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding” and therefore denied disclosure of the material.166 While the sentence from the
Sixth Circuit that the DC Circuit cited seems like direct support
for its position, the context of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion concerned a different subsection of Rule 6.167 The order of the Rule’s
subsections has been edited over the years, and the subsection
referenced in the quote pertained to whether disclosure to a commission investigating a state judge is ordered “preliminarily to or
in connection with a judicial proceeding.”168
While the Sixth Circuit precedent is not precisely on point,
the court’s position still suggests an exhaustive interpretation of
the Rule. While many of the circuits emphasize the importance of
grand jury secrecy, the Sixth Circuit places great weight on the
Rule itself. The Rule is not to be followed simply when it is convenient, and courts should be hesitant to disclose without a rule

161

Id, quoting Carlisle, 517 US at 426.
932 F2d 481 (6th Cir 1991).
163 Id at 488.
164 Id.
165 Id at 483, quoting United States v Sells Engineering, Inc, 463 US 418, 425 (1983).
See also McKeever, 920 F3d at 844.
166 In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F2d at 482 (quotation marks omitted).
167 For the current location of the language, see FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
168 See In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F2d at 482 (quotation marks omitted).
162
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or statute authorizing them to do so. While the Sixth Circuit has
not weighed in on the precise question before the other courts, it
seems likely that the Sixth Circuit will interpret its precedent to
provide support for an exhaustive approach.
The DC Circuit relied on the Eighth Circuit for more direct
support for its reasoning. In United States v McDougal,169 Susan
McDougal sought an unsealed copy of her own testimony in an
earlier civil contempt proceeding.170 The court noted that
“[a]lthough McDougal’s appellate brief and argument suggest
that her request for access was motivated by a desire to recount
in a screenplay or novel [the independent counsel]’s allegedly coercive tactics in the Whitewater investigation, she did not mention this in the district court.”171 Instead, McDougal’s only argument for disclosure was that significant time had passed and
“[t]he reasons for sealing the record have now grown stale and
disappeared.”172 The court found this argument unpersuasive, explaining that “courts will not order disclosure absent a recognized
exception to Rule 6(e) or a valid challenge to the original sealing
order or its implementation.”173 The majority in McKeever and
Judge Sykes’s Carlson dissent identified this language as supportive of their side of the debate.
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s long road to the exhaustive
approach.
The Eleventh Circuit first decided Pitch v United States174
(Pitch I) in February 2019. The case marked the most recent court
of appeals decision affirming supervisory power. In Pitch I, the
Eleventh Circuit considered an argument for a historical significance exception to Rule 6(e).175 The court relied on its prior decision in Hastings and the Second Circuit’s Craig factors to determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
disclosing the records.176

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

559 F3d 837 (8th Cir 2009).
Id at 838.
Id at 841 (quotation marks omitted).
Id.
McDougal, 559 F3d at 840.
915 F3d 704 (11th Cir 2019).
See id at 707.
See id at 707, 711–13.
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The majority in Pitch I explained that it affirmed the use of
supervisory power because it was bound by Hastings.177 But the
Hastings opinion was narrower. The Hastings court emphasized
that the case before it was “closely analogous” to an exception
within the Rule.178 While the court did authorize the use of inherent power, the court cabined its decision by focusing on the situation’s similarity to the Rule’s exception. It is not obvious that a
rule allowing disclosure on the policy ground of historical significance must follow from Hastings.
After a deeply divided opinion, the Eleventh Circuit chose to
rehear the case en banc. Not only did the court reverse its decision
in Pitch I,179 it also overruled Hastings, “the seminal case on non6(e) grand jury disclosure,” in the process.180 The stakes of reversal are significant. Hastings was responsible for the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent that influenced the Second Circuit in Craig, which the Seventh Circuit in turn relied on in
Carlson.
Despite its influential role in the early adoption of the permissive interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit now holds that
“Rule 6(e) by its plain terms limits disclosures of grand jury materials to the circumstances enumerated therein.”181 The Eleventh
Circuit addressed the precedential support from the Supreme
Court182 and the DC Circuit before grounding its answer in the
text.183 According to the Eleventh Circuit, not only is there no historical significance exception, there is also no inherent power to
disclose whatsoever.184 Like its sister circuits, the Eleventh Circuit found comfort in the plain language of the Rule.

177

Id at 707 (“Because we are bound by our decision in Hastings, we affirm.”).
Hastings, 735 F2d at 1268.
179 See Pitch II, 953 F3d at 1241.
180 Craig, 131 F3d at 103.
181 Pitch II, 953 F3d at 1234 (emphasis added).
182 See id at 1235 (“[T]he Supreme Court explained that the exception ‘is, on its face,
an affirmative limitation on the availability of court-ordered disclosure of grand jury materials.’”), quoting United States v Baggot, 463 US 476, 479 (1983).
183 See Pitch II, 953 F3d at 1234:
178

The text and structure of Rule 6(e) thus indicate that the rule is not merely permissive. Rather, it imposes a general rule of nondisclosure, then instructs that
deviations from that rule are not permitted “[u]nless these rules provide otherwise,” and then provides a detailed list of exceptions that specifies precisely
when the rules “provide otherwise.”
184

See id at 1236–37.
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Satisfied with the text, the court then addressed the implications for the grand jury itself if the permissive approach continues
unchecked. Recognizing inherent power to disclose—and specifically, recognizing that power for historically significant documents—puts far too much discretionary power in the hands of
judges:
[T]he creation of a historical-significance exception involves
two layers of policy judgments. The first is the decision to recognize an exception for matters of historical significance generally. The second involves deciding what it means for something to be so “historically significant” that the interest in
disclosure outweighs any interest that the grand jurors, witnesses, and future generations, among others, have in maintaining the secrecy of the proceedings. Under [Marion]
Pitch’s interpretation of Rule 6(e), then, a single district
judge would have the authority to substitute his or her own
judgments on these policy questions on a case-by-case basis,
with the inevitable result that the exceptions to the general
rule of grand jury secrecy would vary from one court to the
next across the nation.185
This case-by-case decision-making means that witnesses and
jurors may no longer be able to rely on the promised secrecy of the
proceedings.186 If these participants fear that their responses will
one day be released, the concern may “have a chilling effect on
future grand jury witnesses and would render the grand jury as
an institution inoperable.”187
***
The circuit split reveals a muddled landscape of decisions unlikely to be reconciled on their own. The courts have sought to
bolster their stances with precedent from their sister circuits,
even when the support is ambiguous. Likewise, some of the courts
have relied on precedent that is inapposite when viewed in context. The problem arises in part from the indeterminate boundaries of supervisory power. Over time courts have built on one another’s allowances until supervisory power has grown to allow
disclosure when the judge deems release appropriate. What
185
186
187

Id at 1236 n 9.
See id.
Pitch II, 953 F3d at 1236 n 9.
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began as a one-time exception in Biaggi, where all parties sought
disclosure, grew to incorporate cases that were closely analogous
to the Rule. From there, the exception grew to allow disclosure for
historically significant documents, and courts taking the permissive approach began to rely on a fact-intensive and nonexhaustive
balancing test for guidance. The DC Circuit rejected this approach, returning to the Rule in holding that the text was exhaustive. The Eleventh Circuit has now joined it.
III. BEYOND THE TEXT: A MORE CONTEXTUALIZED PROPOSAL
FOR AN EXHAUSTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE
The current divide offers a thorough and complete analysis of
the text of the Rule. If the remaining circuits continue to debate
the text alone, however, the stalemate will likely continue. Both
sides have compelling textual arguments, but neither is correct in
maintaining that the text is decisive. This Part begins by explaining why the DC Circuit’s reasoning, though coming to the correct
conclusion, is unconvincing. Text alone is unlikely to persuade the
remaining circuits, as the permissive approach has equally strong
textual arguments. After showing why a textual analysis is insufficient, this Comment lays out alternative sources of authority
that, when considered collectively, make a strong case for an exhaustive interpretation.
First, the historical origins of the grand jury show that the
institution was a separate entity from the executive and the judiciary, suggesting that any supervisory power over those proceedings was intended to be limited. Second, any disclosures allowed
by way of supervisory power were absorbed into the codification
of the Rule on grand jury disclosure. Third, the circuits advocating for a permissive approach misread post-Rules Supreme Court
precedent, confusing discretion within the Rule with discretion
outside of the Rule. Fourth, more recent Supreme Court precedent sharply undermines the argument that district courts retain
supervisory power over the grand jury. Finally, while increases in
the use of supervisory power to justify disclosure may be a judicial
response to perceived weakness in the grand jury, policy pushes
against judicial overreach. Instead, Congress should authorize
broader disclosure power for district courts under the Rule. With
any important grand jury record, there may come a point when
the public’s interest in learning the truth of the nation’s past outweighs the continuing need for secrecy. Congress, not individual
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district court judges, should decide when that time has come. The
former is capable of amending the Rule for all, ensuring the Rule’s
primacy as the source of controlling guidance. The latter could
only release outside of the Rules or not at all, risking case-by-case
confusion.
A. The DC Circuit’s Approach Is Incomplete
The Eleventh and DC Circuits have the right answer—but
for the wrong reasons. The DC Circuit relies almost exclusively
on a textual analysis, concluding that the language is clearly exhaustive and therefore no supervisory power exists over disclosure. This result is both puzzling and unsatisfying. Both sides of
the split seem unwilling to acknowledge that there is genuine uncertainty within the text.
Congress could have made the answer clear by including explicit limiting language. Rule 6(e)(3)(E) could read, for example,
that the “court may authorize disclosure . . . of a grand jury matter only” in the following situations before listing the five exceptions. Alternatively, Congress could have concluded the list of exceptions with the phrase “and in no other circumstances.”
According to the permissive approach, the lack of clear Congressional signals reveals that the Rule was intended to be open-ended.
The exhaustive approach has several arguments in response.
There is explicit limiting language in the “Secrecy” subsection,
the section immediately preceding the exceptions listed in
Rule 6(e)(3). When Congress authorized Rule 6(e)(2) to read
“[u]nless these rules provide otherwise” in limiting disclosures,188
surely they intended that limitation to extend to these rules and
not only the subsection in which that language is found. If disclosure is not allowed unless authorized by these rules, courts have
no basis for looking outside of them. Even if a court wanted to
limit its analysis to the “Exceptions” subsection, it must
acknowledge that there are five listed exceptions for a court. If
Congress intended courts to have more opportunities to disclose,
why did it not include a catchall for extraordinary circumstances?
According to the exhaustive approach, the limiting language in
Rule 6(e)(2) clearly applies to the section that follows, and the use
of a list of exceptions should be understood to be finite.

188

FRCrP 6(e)(2) (emphasis added).
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While both sides argue persuasively for their interpretations,
the most likely answer is that the Rule is simply unclear on its
face. Textual evidence points in both directions. Just as there is
no “only,” there is no clear “not limited to” or “and in extraordinary circumstances” exception. There is a subsection on secrecy,
followed immediately by a subsection on exceptions. No mention
of supervisory power, historical significance, or disclosures outside the norm of secrecy can be found in the text.
The absence of textual clarity means that the solution must
be found elsewhere. I argue that the Eleventh and DC Circuits
reach the correct conclusion, but their arguments would have
been aided by a look at the historical origins of the grand jury.
This history reveals that the grand jury was never meant to fall
under the judiciary but rather to operate as a separate entity, one
endowed with both judicial and prosecutorial powers. This history
begins to make the case for why supervisory power is more limited
in the context of the grand jury than the trial. By showing that
supervisory power over grand jury disclosures no longer exists,
my analysis finds a way around the textual ambiguity. Without
supervisory power over grand juries, the exceptions to the Rule
stand alone.
B. History Shows the Grand Jury Was Intended to Be
Independent
The historical origins of the grand jury reveal that the institution was designed to act autonomously, free from executive and
judicial interference. Returning to the rise of the grand jury in
England and its later adoption in the colonies, I argue that the
grand jury was intended to operate as a hybrid, independent institution for the public. Combining judicial setting and procedure
with executive-like power to indict, the grand jury was set up as
a panel for the people—a check on the two branches that it was
created to resemble.
1. English origins.
The grand jury originated in England in the twelfth century.189 It initially involved royal justices and a jury composed of

189 See generally R.H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon
Law, 50 U Chi L Rev 613 (1983).
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men selected by the Crown.190 These twelve “good and lawful men”
of every township were designated as the accusing body.191 They
served as “a system of local informers,” disclosing the names of
suspected offenders to the king.192 Over time, the juries began considering allegations made by nonjury members and nonofficials.193
A royal prosecutor would lay out the evidence and witnesses of
the accused.194 If the jury was convinced, it returned a “true bill,”
a decision marking the allegation as true, or a “no bill,” a decision
deeming the allegation to be false.195 Because of royal involvement, “no bills” were rarely found.196 Any jury that failed to indict
a suspect that the Crown put forward was fined.197 Despite the
involvement of royal prosecutors, jury members kept the ability
to accuse and indict on their own.198
The jury’s task was not limited to indicting enemies of the
Crown; it investigated conduct that affected the people in their
daily lives.199 Jurors inquired about the collection of taxes and the
condition of public works, including the upkeep of roads, highways, bridges, and jails.200 An oath of secrecy also developed during this period, as the men declared that “they will lawful presentment make of such chapters as shall be delivered to them in
writing and in this they will not fail for any love, hatred, fear,
reward, or promise, and that they will conceal the secrets, so help
them God and the Saints.”201
An expanded role and the ability to keep its discussions secret allowed the grand jury to grow in power and popularity.
Grand juries stood up to political pressure from the Crown and
from the government, solidifying a reputation for courage and

190 See Richard D. Younger, The People’s Panel: The Grand Jury in the United States,
1634–1941 1 (Brown 1963). See also Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic
Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am Crim L Rev 701, 708 (1972).
191 Younger, The People’s Panel at 1 (cited in note 190). See also Helmholz, 50 U Chi
L Rev at 617 (cited in note 189) (explaining that the earliest iterations of the grand jury
asked men “to give voice to common fame,” to share who was “publicly suspected”).
192 Kadish, 24 Fla St U L Rev at 6 (cited in note 38).
193 See Younger, The People’s Panel at 1 (cited in note 190).
194 See id.
195 Id.
196 See Kadish, 24 Fla St U L Rev at 6–7 (cited in note 38).
197 Id at 7.
198 See Younger, The People’s Panel at 1 (cited in note 190).
199 See Kadish, 24 Fla St U L Rev at 7 (cited in note 38).
200 Id.
201 Id at 7 n 41 (emphasis added).
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independence.202 Proponents of the grand jury heralded it as a vehicle for liberty and public oversight.203 That reputation quickly
caught the attention of the American colonists.204
2. Colonial adoption.
Grand juries were already well on their way in the colonies,
with colonists following the English path and relying on jurors for
indictments.205 In contrast to England, the colonial grand juries
exercised more independence from the start.206 While English juries had to rely on royal officials to refer bills of indictment, limited local government and policing meant that the colonial juries
took on this task themselves.207 Colonial grand jurors often presented matters on their own, turning the investigation upon magistrates or local leaders, like ministers who negligently failed to
do their duty by “not checking upon those who failed to attend
church on Sunday.”208
Grand juries gained favor in the colonies in no small part because of the political writings of English advocates. Lord Chancellor John Somers, an English proponent of the grand jury and
popular author in the colonies, proposed that grand juries did not
need to rely on judges in carrying out their role.209 Somers argued
that jury power should be construed broadly and was not limited
to the matters that the judge presented to them.210 The English
legal theorist Sir John Hawles praised the grand jury as the protector of the public against government persecution, rejecting the
idea that courts have the power to influence their decisions.211
Finally, the English writer Henry Care emphasized that grand
juries must be able to make autonomous decisions, free from judicial oversight and involvement.212 These works guided the colonists as to the proper power and role of the grand jury.213
202 See Washburn, 76 Fordham L Rev at 2342 (cited in note 29). See also Younger,
The People’s Panel at 2 (cited in note 190).
203 See Washburn, 76 Fordham L Rev at 2342–43 (cited in note 29).
204 See id at 2343.
205 See Younger, The People’s Panel at 2 (cited in note 190).
206 See id at 5.
207 See Washburn, 76 Fordham L Rev at 2343 (cited in note 29).
208 Younger, The People’s Panel at 11 (quotation marks omitted) (cited in note 190).
209 Id at 21.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Younger, The People’s Panel at 21 (cited in note 190).
213 See id at 21–22.
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By the time of the Revolution, the grand jury was a key part
of colonial checks on government. These juries represented the
people, enforcing only those laws they deemed to be just and
standing up against persecution at home and abroad.214 The
struggle to wrest authority from the grand jury came to a head in
1768 when Boston grand jurors refused to indict the editors of the
Boston Gazette for libel of the governor.215 The chief justice of Massachusetts instructed the jury that “they might depend upon being damned if they did not find a true bill.”216 Nevertheless, the
jurors refused, and “the chief justice was helpless” to change their
minds.217
When the Constitution of the United States went into effect,
the grand jury was left out.218 The centralized government would
include three separate branches, and the Constitution prescribed
the powers of each.219 When the federal court system was expanded under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the grand jury was still
excluded.220
The public’s desire for the right to indictment through a
grand jury was taken up by the states in ratification.221 In 1791,
Congress approved twelve constitutional amendments that were
then sent to the states for ratification.222 The Fifth Amendment
was adopted with the Bill of Rights, constitutionally enshrining
the grand jury: “[N]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”223 The Framers sought for the American
grand jury, “like its English forerunner, to act as both a ‘sword
and a shield.’” 224 More specifically:
As a sword, the grand jury has extraordinary power to carry
out its investigatory function. . . . Although these powers are
exercised under the court’s supervision and are not
214

Id at 26.
See id at 28.
216 Younger, The People’s Panel at 28 (quotation marks omitted) (cited in note 190).
217 See id.
218 See id at 45.
219 Kadish, 24 Fla St U L Rev at 11 (cited in note 38).
220 Id.
221 See Younger, The People’s Panel at 45 (cited in note 190).
222 Kadish, 24 Fla St U L Rev at 12 (cited in note 38). Ten of the twelve amendments
were ratified in the Bill of Rights, one has since been ratified as the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, and one is still before the states.
223 US Const Amend V.
224 Schiappa, 43 Cath U L Rev at 330 (cited in note 18).
215
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unlimited, the grand jury may use them to obtain every
man’s evidence. As a shield, the grand jury is designed to provide a fair method for instituting criminal proceedings. The
grand jury, after deliberating in secret, allows the government to prosecute only those persons for whom it has probable cause to believe have committed a crime.225
Long after the proceedings are over, the deliberations remain
secret. The Supreme Court affirmed in United States v Johnson226
that secrecy is “as important for the protection of the innocent as
for the pursuit of the guilty.”227 Those who are not indicted can
move on, free from the shadow of persecution that would remain
if their testimony was disclosed.228 Those who will later be called
as witnesses may speak freely, knowing that their answers will
not be revealed to those that may wish them harm.229 Those jurors
who are called upon to weigh the statements of those witnesses
can trust that the witnesses or conspirators are not privy to the
statements of those who have testified before them.230 Those that

225

Id at 330–31 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
319 US 503 (1943).
227 Id at 513. For a summary of the Court’s longstanding justifications for secrecy, see
United States v Procter & Gamble Co, 356 US 677, 681 n 6 (1958):
226

(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is
exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
228

See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 360 US at 405.
See id.
230 See John Somers, The Security of Englishmen’s Lives: Or, The Trust, Power, and
Duty of Grand Juries of England 29 (Dublin 1766):
229

Yet the reason will be still more manifest for keeping secret the accusations and
the evidence by the grand inquest, if it be well considered, how useful and necessary it is for discovering truth in the examinations of witnesses in many, if not
in most cases that may come before them; when if by this privacy witnesses may
be examined in such manner and order, as prudence and occasion direct; and no
one of them be suffered to know who hath been examined before him, nor what
questions have been asked him, nor what answers he hath given, it may probably be found out whether a witness hath been biassed in his testimony by malice
or revenge, or the fear or favour of men in power, or the love or hopes of lucre
and gain in present or future, or promises of impunity for some enormous crime.
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are called upon to judge their peers have the privacy to evaluate
the indictment free from the oversight of a judge.231
Since before the time of the Founding, the grand jury has possessed “broad inquisitorial powers.”232 While these powers were
“derived from the government,” the juries are “of the people, not
of the state.”233 While the grand jury is weaker and more reliant
on the prosecution than it once was, the historical separation
sheds light on the intended relationship between the government,
the judiciary, and the grand jury. The grand jury was intended to
be independent of both. As prosecutors have exerted more power
over grand jury proceedings, judges may react by seeking to insert
themselves into the proceedings as well as a form of oversight.
While well-intentioned, executive overreach does not justify the
same from the judiciary.
History shows that the grand jury solidified its position in the
Bill of Rights by serving as the voice of the people and a check on
the government. Rather than an appendage or subsidiary of the
courts, the grand jury has always operated in a gray area, operating under the auspices of the judiciary while maintaining investigative power more similar to that of the executive. This positioning continues to be important today, as judges must recognize
that the grand jury is intentionally different from the trial jury
over which they preside. The independent grand jury that the colonists sought was not guided or directed by a judge. That institutional relationship suggests that supervisory power was limited
from the beginning. If there was little to no supervisory power
from the start, the current argument for maintaining supervisory
power loses its foundation.
C. Pre-Rules Uses of Supervisory Power Were Incorporated
into the Rule’s Codified Exceptions
The permissive view emphasized pre-Rules discretion as a
sign that supervisory power existed at common law. But the type
231

See id at 30:

Yet further, their private examinations may discover truth out of some disagreement of the witnesses, when separately interrogated, and every of the grand inquest ask them questions for his own satisfaction, about the matters which have
come to his particular knowledge, and this freely, without awe or control of
judges, or distrust of his own parts, or fear to be checked for asking impertinent
questions.
232
233

Younger, The People’s Panel at 245 (cited in note 190).
Id.
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of disclosures allowed through pre-Rules discretion are now allowed by the Rule’s listed exceptions, suggesting that the Rule
has absorbed that authority.
The Seventh Circuit in Carlson relied on Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co for a pre-Rules testament to common law discretion. The court
pointed to language that release of materials “rests in the sound
discretion of the [trial] court” and “disclosure is wholly proper
where the ends of justice require it.”234 In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co,
the Court wrote that “use of grand jury testimony for the purpose
of refreshing the recollection of a witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.”235 While it initially appears compelling
that judges were permitted discretion, it is worth situating this
discretion in the historical moment, a time before the codification
of the Rules and before any disclosure was formally authorized.
The decision in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co illustrates an attempt
by the Court to allow for some disclosure. The grand jury was historically expected to keep all matters secret. With no formal rule
allowing for disclosure and a default of secrecy, the Court recognized that release of some materials may benefit the proceedings.
To help the grand jury reach its verdict, for example, the Court
allowed jurors to have access to previously undisclosed statements of witnesses.236 Total secrecy was not in the interest of the
grand jury and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co recognized that there were
some situations in which disclosure aided the process, such as
with recall of evidence.
This discretion was already closely related to the needs of the
particular grand jury in session, and the Federal Rules used similar examples when it adopted exceptions to the secrecy norm. The
allowed disclosure within Socony-Vacuum Oil Co now seemingly
falls within the scope of Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i)—using grand jury material to refresh a witness’s recollection is using it “in connection
with a judicial proceeding.”237 Rather than showing that inherent
discretion survived the codification of the Rules, Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co should be read as an example of the kind of disclosure that
they incorporated. The Rule’s exceptions are limited in their scope
and are acknowledgments that secrecy may not always be the

234 Carlson, 837 F3d at 762 (quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original), quoting Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US at 233–24.
235 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US at 233.
236 Id.
237 FRCrP 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
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best approach for the mission of the grand jury. Allowing a witness access to review his own previous statement is a far cry
from permitting full release of records to a doctoral student for
his dissertation.
This interpretation aligns with the understanding that
Rule 6(e)’s adoption codified the common law pertaining to grand
jury secrecy.238 The Advisory Committee Note for Rule 6(e) explains that the Rule “continues the traditional practice of secrecy
. . . except when the court permits a disclosure.”239 This allowance
for disclosure meant that the preexisting principle of grand jury
secrecy, developed in England and continuing throughout the institution’s history, persisted with the exception that courts now
could exercise a disclosure option.240
Professors Lori E. Shaw and Susan W. Brenner, authors of
an oft-cited treatise on the grand jury, refer to the Rule’s approach
as “common law plus.”241 Rule 6 “codified the common law plus it
authorized disclosure to defendants challenging an indictment for
grand jury irregularities.”242
If pre–Federal Rules courts did have the “inherent power” to
give defendants grand jury information, the rule absorbed
that power; if they did not have that power, the rule gave it
to them. Either way, Rule 6(e) represents the sum total of a
federal court’s authority to allow access to “matters occurring
before the grand jury.”243
The accused may challenge perceived misconduct or procedural errors, and these were common reasons why judges resorted
to their inherent power to disclose at common law.244 Accordingly,

238 See Susan W. Brenner and Lori E. Shaw, Federal Grand Jury: A Guide to Law
and Practice § 18:2 (West 2d ed 2019) (arguing that supervisory power did not survive the
codification of the Federal Rules).
239 FRCrP 6, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1944 Amendment, Note to
Subdivision (e).
240 See Brenner and Shaw, Federal Grand Jury § 18:2 (cited in note 238).
241 Id.
242 Id (emphasis added).
243 Id (emphasis added). See also Janice S. Peterson, Criminal Procedure—Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e): Criminal or Civil Contempt for Violations of Grand Jury
Secrecy?, 12 W New Eng L Rev 245, 259 (1990) (“The rule, as originally enacted, continued
the common law practice in the federal courts.”); Beale, 84 Colum L Rev at 1493 (cited in
note 39) (“Although provisions such as Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which was promulgated pursuant to statutory authority, are presumptively valid, no presumptive validity should attach to rulings premised only on supervisory power.”).
244 See Brenner and Shaw, Federal Grand Jury § 18:2 (cited in note 238).
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the Rule now allows a court to disclose information pertaining to
a grand jury proceeding to “a defendant upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because
of matters occurring before the grand jury.”245 Because there was
“no right of discovery before trial” at common law, judges often
had to rely on inherent power arguments in order to rectify this
perceived wrong.246 Congress incorporated this judge-made discretion into one of the Rule’s exceptions.247 Shaw and Brenner argue that the Rule continues the default understanding of secrecy
while absorbing the common law need for disclosure.
Pre-Rules discretion has been used as evidence in support of
continued supervisory power, but this earlier discretion is not dispositive evidence of discretion today. Shaw and Brenner convincingly make the case for a “common law plus” understanding of the
Rule, where any supervisory power that existed at common law
was incorporated into the Rule’s exceptions. Early supervisory
power was itself limited and a response to the judiciary’s need to
allow for some disclosure under the harsh default of complete secrecy. Complete secrecy is no longer required. Judges may allow
the same releases they sought at common law, now through the
authority of the Rule. This understanding is bolstered by the
Court’s handling of supervisory power after the Rule’s codification.
D. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co Has Been Misinterpreted
The permissive approach likewise relies on Court precedent
that describes judicial discretion as a justification for its use of
supervisory power. Critically, courts have read Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co’s language regarding discretion out of context. This
problem was exacerbated when the Eleventh and the Seventh
Circuits cited to and followed the language of the Second Circuit’s
original misreading of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
Courts adopting the permissive view repeatedly cite to one
line in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co: “[T]he federal trial courts as
well as the Courts of Appeals have been nearly unanimous in regarding disclosure as committed to the discretion of the trial

245

Id (quotation marks omitted).
Id (quotation marks omitted).
247 See id. See also FRCrP 6, Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1944
Amendment, Note to Subdivision (e), citing Schmidt v United States, 115 F2d 394, 397
(6th Cir 1940), and United States v American Medical Association, 26 F Supp 429, 431
(DDC 1939).
246
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judge. Our cases announce the same principle, and Rule 6(e) is
but declaratory of it.”248 From only this line, it is understandable
that this language has been interpreted to mean that the Rule
has done nothing to change a judge’s ability to exercise discretion
regarding disclosure of grand jury materials. If supervisory power
existed before the Rule, the argument goes, it apparently continues to do so today. The problem with this approach is that the
“discretion” referred to by the Court pertains to discretion of a
judge to deny disclosure even when it is permitted by one of the
Rule’s exceptions. The Court was describing a very different type
of discretion—the discretion a trial court judge has within the parameters of the Rules, not outside of them.
The problem with the permissive approach becomes clear
when one returns to the rest of the Court’s Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co opinion. The petitioner argued that the district court was required to release the grand jury materials because the case fell
under one of the prescribed exceptions in Rule 6(e).249 But the Supreme Court was not persuaded.250 It was not enough that the
case fell under the scope of the Rule because the petitioner failed
to meet the burden of “particularized need.”251 To “outweigh[ ] the
policy of secrecy,” one must show a particularized need for the
specific materials requested.252 Whether that burden has been
met is up to the discretion of the trial judge.253 Therefore, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co should not be understood as allowing trial
judges broad discretion in any case concerning grand jury disclosures. Rather, the precedent supports disclosure only in those
cases that already fall within the confines of an exception to
Rule 6(e). The sentence immediately preceding the contested language makes this argument decisive: “Petitioners concede, as
they must, that any disclosure of grand jury minutes is covered
by [Rule] 6(e) promulgated by this Court in 1946 after the approval of Congress.”254
The circuits following the permissive interpretation have continually relied on Socony-Vacuum Oil Co’s pre-Rules interpretation and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co’s post-Rules justification. As
248
249
250
251
252
253
254

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 360 US at 399 (citations omitted).
Id.
See id at 400.
Id.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 360 US at 400.
See id at 399.
Id at 398–99 (emphasis added).
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the previous two sections show, this reliance seems to have led
the circuits astray from the original intention of the Court. While
the Court over time acknowledged that some disclosures were
helpful for the operation of the grand jury, secrecy has always
been the norm. Where discretion has been authorized, it has been
authorized for courts to lean toward the choice to not release, rather than to release. Secrecy, rather than disclosure, is the default assumption. More recent Supreme Court precedent, mostly
overlooked by the permissive view but addressed by the dissent
in Carlson, call into question the belief that supervisory power
exists outside of the Rule.
E. Recent Supreme Court Precedent Also Sharply Undermines
the Permissive Argument
In relying so heavily on Socony-Vacuum Oil Co and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, courts miss more recent Supreme Court
guidance on supervisory power over the grand jury. Two cases,
United States v Williams, authored in 1992, and United States v
Baggot,255 handed down in 1983, call into the question the assumption that supervisory power exists over the grand jury at all.
1. United States v Williams.
The Supreme Court in Williams stressed the limited nature
of the judiciary’s power over the grand jury. The question before
the Court was whether a district court could dismiss an indictment that was otherwise valid because the attorney for the government did not disclose “substantial exculpatory evidence” to the
grand jury.256 John H. Williams Jr, the subject of an indictment
for financial crimes,257 argued that the Court’s previous holding in
United States v Hasting258 suggested that disclosure should be allowed under district courts’ supervisory power.259 In Hasting, the
Court had noted that federal courts “may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution
or by the Congress.”260 Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin
Scalia explained that decisions on discretion in the trial context
255
256
257
258
259
260

463 US 476 (1983).
Williams, 504 US at 37–38.
Id at 38.
461 US 499 (1983).
Williams, 504 US at 45.
Hasting, 461 US at 505.
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were distinguishable from the grand jury context. Looking to history, Justice Scalia emphasized that grand juries were different:
“Because the grand jury is an institution separate from the
courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside, we think
it clear that, as a general matter at least, no such ‘supervisory’
judicial authority exists.”261 The Court held that the federal judiciary lacks supervisory authority to compel a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence.262 More important for present purposes, it gave a clear signal about the lack of supervisory power
over the grand jury.263
Justice Scalia began with a reminder that the grand jury “has
not been textually assigned [ ] to any of the branches”264 and is
therefore “a constitutional fixture in its own right.”265 While acknowledging that the grand jury “normally operates . . . in the
courthouse and under judicial auspices,” he argued that its relationship to the judiciary was “at arm’s length.”266 The role of a
judge in these proceedings was limited to calling the grand jurors
and administering their oaths.267 The grand jury must be “free to
pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision”268 as “the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional guarantee
presupposes an investigative body acting independently of either
prosecuting attorney or judge.”269
After establishing the operational independence of the grand
jury, Justice Scalia explained that “it should come as no surprise
that we have been reluctant to invoke the judicial supervisory
power as a basis for prescribing modes of grand jury procedure.”270
If federal courts have the power to create rules of grand jury procedure, it “is a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the
power they maintain over their own proceedings.”271
Carlson began its defense of supervisory power by citing to
Williams, but the Seventh Circuit’s view advocates a position that
261

Williams, 504 US at 47 (emphasis added).
Id at 55.
263 Id at 47.
264 Id.
265 Williams, 504 US at 47 (quotation marks omitted), quoting United States v
Chanen, 549 F2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir 1977).
266 Williams, 504 US at 47 (emphasis added).
267 Id. For more background on the judge’s limited role, see Part I.A.
268 Williams, 504 US at 48–49, quoting United States v Dionisio, 410 US 1, 17–18 (1973).
269 Williams, 504 US at 49 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
270 Id at 49–50.
271 Id at 50.
262
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Williams apparently rejects. Justice Scalia firmly endorsed grand
jury independence and cautioned against courts extending their
powers onto them. While the Seventh Circuit cited to Williams for
the point that courts had “a very limited” power over grand juries,272 the sentence in full read that “[t]hese authorities suggest
that any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their own
initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not
remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own
proceedings.”273 This language is not an endorsement of supervisory power of the grand jury. Instead, Justice Scalia said that
even if there is limited power—a question the Court did not decide—it is nowhere near as expansive as that of courts’ supervisory power over trials.
Furthermore, even if there is limited supervisory power, it is
one thing to say there is limited supervisory power over proceedings, and quite another to say there is limited supervisory power
to disclose those proceedings. The former allows for intervention
to ensure the legitimacy and integrity of the proceedings. The latter affords a judge the singular authority to reveal what is otherwise secret. While Carlson uses Williams’s language that the
grand jury convenes “in the courthouse and under judicial auspices” to support the idea that it operates under judicial control,274
Williams again says in full that “[a]lthough the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial
auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch
has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length.”275 Williams
and the permissive approach circuits are making different points:
Williams brings up the institutional relationship to question the
extent of judicial control. The permissive approach relies on judicial control as a given to justify the use of supervisory power.
2. United States v Baggot.
While Williams explained why supervisory power is so limited over the grand jury, Baggot suggested that the Court would
not consider disclosure under the supervisory power to be a possibility. The Supreme Court in Baggot answered whether a
272
273
274

Carlson, 837 F3d at 762 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Williams, 504 US at 50.
Williams, 504 US at 50 (emphasis added).
See Carlson, 837 F3d at 761 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Williams, 504 US

at 47.
275

Williams, 504 US at 47 (emphasis added).
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district court could allow grand jury documents to be disclosed in
order to assess a grand jury defendant’s income tax liability.276
The district court had concluded that disclosure was not authorized under the Rule but had allowed its release under the district
court’s “general supervisory powers over the grand jury.”277 The
Supreme Court did not mention this supervisory power again in
its opinion. Instead, it looked to the Rule to determine whether
disclosure was allowed.278 The Court, when given the opportunity,
made no indication that there was an alternative to the listed exceptions. In contrast, the Court emphasized the language and
specificity of the text: “[The list of exceptions] reflects a judgment
that not every beneficial purpose, or even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy.”279 Thus, the Supreme Court focused on applying the Rule
as written, with no indication that supervisory power existed as
an alternative.
When given the chance to address supervisory power to disclose, the Court ignored its use and decided the case based solely
on the language of the Rule. This decision suggests that the Court
believes the Rule to be the only valid source of disclosure authority.
F.

Policy Cautions Against Expanding Judicial Intervention

The permissive approach began as a one-off allowance in
Biaggi. Then, Hastings permitted disclosure when the Rule was
closely analogous to the situation. Now, the permissive approach
endorses disclosure when the end is socially desirable. This evolving expansion results in judicial overreach. While the Supreme
Court has affirmed the existence of some supervisory power, the
lack of statutory or constitutional grounding means that judges
are without guidance as to its breadth or application to the grand
jury.280
Unencumbered by doctrinal limitations, the open-ended language of the phrase “supervisory power” has invited an expansive
interpretation. Courts employing supervisory power have

276
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280

Baggot, 463 US at 477.
Id at 478.
Id at 479–82.
Id at 480.
See Beale, 84 Colum L Rev at 1434 (cited in note 39).
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generally felt relatively free to adopt rules intended to promote
what the courts identify as the ends of justice and good public
policy.281
While this poses a problem for the lower courts in general, it
is especially vexing in the context of grand jury proceedings.282
Cases in which a judge would exert supervisory power over a
grand jury create a “conflict between the Executive and Judicial
branches of the federal government over their respective relationships to the federal grand jury.”283 Professor Sara Sun Beale contends that judicial interference with the grand jury should be extremely limited so that it may “be free to pursue its investigations
unhindered by external influence or supervision.”284 The lack of
interference ensures that grand juries are free to make the decision that reflects the will of the people. Grand juries are not determining guilt or innocence. They are determining whether the
government has made a sufficient case to indict an accused. They
have independent authority to indict or not to indict. Though a
prosecutor may argue for a certain outcome, the choice is supposed to ultimately be the grand jury’s own as the voice of the
people. The grand jury developed secrecy in part to protect itself
from judicial interference.285 More oversight is not necessarily for
the better.
While this view was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Williams, limiting judicial oversight to the Rule’s exceptions creates
the understandable concern that matters of public interest will
never see the light of day. District court judges within jurisdictions that follow the exhaustive approach may not release grand
jury records on their own. It is worth considering whether that
outcome is socially desirable.
The current exhaustive approach presumes that grand jury
records that are not covered by an exception will remain secret
forever.286 Perhaps this is correct. Secrecy, as has been shown
above, is vitally important to the functioning of the grand jury.
281

Id.
See id at 1459.
283 Id.
284 Beale, 84 Colum L Rev at 1492 (cited in note 39) (stipulating that interference is
only justified when necessary to protect the rights of witnesses), quoting Dionisio, 410 US
at 17–18.
285 See Kadish, 24 Fla St U L Rev at 15 (cited in note 38).
286 See Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes
of Meeting *44 (June 11–12, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/65SZ-HWQQ (noting that
grand jury proceedings have historically been afforded “absolute secrecy”).
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Does our need for secrecy ever wane? The Second Circuit wrote
that “[t]o the extent that the John Wilkes Booth or Aaron Burr
conspiracies . . . led to grand jury investigations, historical interest might by now overwhelm any continued need for secrecy.”287
There is merit to this point, and, perhaps surprisingly, the government agrees.288
Attorney General Eric Holder put forward a proposal to add
a historical significance exception to the Rule in 2011,289 and the
time has come for Congress and the Rules Committee to reconsider this position. The government took the position that
Rule 6(e) is exhaustive and would therefore continue to presumptively bar attempts for release.290 But the government recognized
that the public has a legitimate interest in learning about these
significant proceedings.291 Holder therefore proposed that a historical significance exception be created within the text of the
Rule.292
This proposal did not pass.293 Several of the opinions dismiss
that decision as inconclusive evidence for either side,294 but it is
worth considering what has changed since. The committee
minutes show deference to legislative action, concern that this
proposal would switch the default from secrecy to release, and
skepticism that change would be premature.295 Only a couple of
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294 See Carlson, 837 F3d at 765 (“We give this history no weight one way or the
other.”); id at 771 n 2 (Sykes dissenting) (“My colleagues decline to give this history any
weight ‘one way or the other,’ and I agree.”) (citation omitted); Pitch v United States, 953
F3d 1226, 1241 (11th Cir 2020) (en banc) (Pitch II) (“The Advisory Committee minutes are
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district courts had dealt with the issue at the time, and the
minutes explain that they resolved the issue through inherent
power.296 Since then, that inherent power has been challenged.
Because the Supreme Court has chosen to let the issue lie for now,
Congress is the only remaining body with authority to change the
Rule.297
***
More disclosures may be beneficial to the public interest and
the integrity of the grand jury as an institution, but supervisory
power is not the solution. As the Eleventh Circuit persuasively
wrote, policy choices over when to allow disclosure are best left to
Congress.298 Allowing courts to make these decisions at their discretion would “lay dangerous precedent for future judicial encroachment upon the role of the grand jury.”299 Witnesses, jurors,
and even judges benefit from guidance on the rules of the grand
jury. Inherent power “threatens to undermine the essential principle that Rule 6(e) encompasses, within its four corners, the rule
of grand-jury secrecy and all of its exceptions and limitations.”300
As long as case-by-case discretion is on the table, those who play
a role in the grand jury proceedings cannot be sure of what will
be kept secret and what will be disclosed. If permitting disclosure
is desirable for the benefit of the public, any rule authorizing such
disclosure should be clearly defined and applied across the board.
Given the historical independence of the grand jury from the
control of both the executive and the judiciary, courts should
abide by the exceptions within the Federal Rule. If disclosures
outside the current exceptions promote the public interest, Congress may consider revising the Rule.301 If Congress authorized
such procedural changes, the Rule could be amended to accommodate the judicial desire for more disclosures.302 Until then, courts
should interpret Rule 6(e) to be exhaustive. Academics and the
general public may strongly desire more transparency in the
workings of the grand jury, and this may in turn motivate Congress to intervene. The Supreme Court, in forgoing the chance to
296
297
298
299
300
301
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weigh in, has left it to the circuits and the Rules Committee to
work through the issue.303 Though the goal of increased transparency around historically significant events is a valuable one, individual judicial discretion is the wrong approach. The Rules
Committee may, through Congress, determine that the best
course of action is to amend the Rules. Courts can expedite that
process by denying any petitions that do not fall within the current exceptions.
CONCLUSION
In disputes over historically significant records, the equities
of the situation appear aligned with the permissive approach,
which affords courts discretion over whether to release accounts
of grand jury proceedings. Some of the grand jury proceedings occurred decades before, the relevant parties may be deceased, and
the public may benefit from learning the truth of high-profile historical events. It is unsurprising that when asked to authorize
disclosure, many judges find that the benefit of disclosure outweighs the continued need for secrecy in that case. Judges who
find this a socially valuable end can rely on the Rule’s ambiguity
and may interpret the lack of specific prohibition as permission
to exercise supervisory power.
But historical origins and principles of the grand jury, as well
as overlooked Supreme Court precedent, weigh in favor of an exhaustive view of the Rule—one that limits courts’ discretion to
only the exceptions explicitly listed in the Rule. If judges allow
broad disclosure whenever a member of the public seeks access to
interesting records, the result would vitiate the grand jury’s
promise of secrecy that protects those accused in the past and facilitates the success of future investigations.
Therefore, a solution to the interpretive problem must be consistent with the interest in protecting the grand jury from encroaching judicial oversight while acknowledging how far the
grand jury has veered since its inception. The text of the Rule can
hold clues for both sides, and a decision that relies solely on textual analysis is ultimately unsatisfying and unpersuasive.
The most sensible solution is to look beyond the text of the
Rule and consider the positioning of the grand jury relative to the

303 See McKeever v Barr, 140 S Ct 597, 597 (2020) (Breyer respecting denial of certiorari) (calling on the Rules Committee to take up the issue).
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judiciary—an institution “at arm’s length.” By understanding the
institutional relationship, it becomes clear that judges have far
less influence over the grand jury than they do over their own
proceedings. Any supervisory power that the judiciary had over
the grand jury was supplanted by the exceptions to the Rule. This
conclusion is rooted in the history of the grand jury as a separate
institution, the adoption of the Federal Rules as the guiding
source for judges, and Supreme Court precedent that emphasizes
the need for secrecy and independence in grand jury proceedings.
Supervisory power is the wrong approach to a difficult question, but that does not mean that the aim of the approach is unsound. If more disclosure is socially desirable because the public
benefits from learning about previously unreported events, it
should be left to Congress to revise the Rule. Discretionary decisions by individual courts on a case-by-case basis not only exceed
judicial authority and harm the independence of the grand jury,
they also muddy the doctrinal landscape and create confusion for
future courts. The Rules Committee and Congress ought to reexamine the Rule itself as well as the arguments for adding an additional exception for extraordinary circumstances. Until then,
courts should abide by the exceptions to the Rule and let Congress
determine whether more judicial control over the modern grand
jury is needed.

